DID B.C. Supreme Court Judge Janice Dillon go too far when she bent over backwards to hand disgraced RCMP Cpl. Benjamin Montgomery Robinson a lenient punishment for his crimes?
Dillon sentenced Robinson to a 12-month conditional term for obstruction of justice in connection with a collision that killed Delta motorcyclist Orion Hutchinson in October, 2008. In her reasons, Dillon noted that while Robinson's obstruction was "deliberate and calculated," it was "his first offence." She also took into account his aboriginal heritage.
Strictly speaking, Dillon is correct in saying this was Robinson's first offence. Her March 23, 2012 decision was indeed the first time the courts had had an opportunity to declare him guilty of anything, even though his impaired driving may well have been the sole cause of the crash.
Meanwhile, he and the three RCMP officers he was supervising are still facing perjury charges for their alleged false testimony at the Braidwood inquiry into the five-times-tasered death of Polish immigrant Robert Dziekanski at Vancouver Airport on Oct. 14, 2007.
They have not been found guilty of a crime, however, meaning Dillon couldn't take these incidents into account.
The question of aboriginal heritage is more complex. It has been used legitimately in the past to mitigate against harsh sentencing, but this case is different in many ways from those precedents.
Having read Dillon's ninepage document several times, I still cannot reconcile my lack of sympathy for the Robinson decision with my completely different reaction to the 18month conditional sentence given to Del Louie for the injuries he inflicted on Coast Mountain bus driver Charles Dixon.
Both perpetrators are aboriginal; both lacked any immediate or sincere concern for their victims and both were significantly affected by their background of alcohol use and abuse for which both must undergo treatment.
So why can I agree with the Louie decision and yet criticize Dillon's stay-at-home-unlessyou-have-somewhere-to-go sentence? Perhaps because I haven't heard anyone say that Robinson was born with Fetal Alcohol Spectrum Disorder and because the man knew exactly what he was doing when he fled the accident scene to go home for two shots of vodka.
My concerns were confirmed by Union of B.C. Indian Chiefs president Stewart Phillip in our conversation last week: "As an RCMP officer, he swore to uphold the law and protect the public," he began.
"I don't agree with the judge's decision to use Robinson's aboriginal culture and the Supreme Court of Canada Gladue precedent as a reason to allow him to avoid jail time for what he did," said Phillip.
He's right. I don't agree either because although the Supreme Court supported the lower court's decision to take alcoholism and an abusive background into account in the sentencing of B.C. aboriginal Jamie Tanis Gladue for manslaughter, the court specifically noted in March 2012: "These matters, on their own, do not necessarily justify a different sentence for aboriginal offenders."
Robinson's case is also markedly different from that of Leanne Moorman, who was charged in relation to her involvement in the September, 2008 hit-and-run death of 64year old Dennis Bird, a long-time worker with Vancouver's Native Housing Society.
Like Robinson, she had attended a party before the event and was suspected of being impaired by drugs and/or alcohol at the time of the accident. She, too, left the scene before police arrived, possibly for the same reason - to thwart justice.
But unlike Robinson, Moorman did not have RCMP counselling and support services available for her addictions. Charged with dangerous driving causing death, she pled guilty on all counts, showed obvious remorse for her actions and unlike Robinson received a 15month jail sentence, a further two years of probation and is subject to a five-year driving ban.
So in Robinson's case, when the maximum sentence for obstruction of justice is 10 years - let alone his obstruction was premeditated - why did the Crown ask for a jail sentence of only "three to nine months, or a conditional sentence of 12 to 18 months"? And why would Dillon opt to sentence him so lightly?
When I first heard Dillon's decision, my immediate response was, "I sure hope the Crown will appeal."
But even that would be a faint hope for justice, because an appeal must be based on a judge's errors in law, not on community reaction or the opinion of the victims' family that the sentence was a travesty of justice.
No wonder Phillip believes the Crown and Dillon's penalty put the Gladue principle at risk.
